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COMMENT/Utility and the New Legislation
An invention must be "useful"' in order for it to be patentable. In the
absence of a definition of this term in any of the patent statutes from 1790
to the present, interpretation of the term "useful" has been left to the ju-
diciary and to the Patent Office which has issued guidelines2 gleaned from
case law. However, legislation recently submitted to Congress attempts to
supply a legislative determination of what the term "useful" should include.,3
The proposed statute states: "The term 'useful' shall include, but shall not
be limited to, utility in agriculture, commerce, industry, or research." '4
This newly proposed definition of "utility" has gained wide acceptance by
those most directly affected. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion and the American Patent Law Association have expressed their ap-
proval of the term "utility in research." 5  The Supreme Court treated this
entire problem as one of statutory construction when it stated, "a process
patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to
the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which
should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute."
This article will discuss the development of the utility requirement from
the first Patent Act of 17907 to the present. Since there is no legislative
history or evidence of congressional intent, only case law and judicial in-
terpretation is available to interpret what was meant by the statutory require-
1. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
2. 849 0. G. PAT. OFF. 567 (1968).
3. S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Other definitions of utility can be found
in legislation submitted to the 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Those include the ABA
Bill, H.R. 13951 and S. 2597 § 100(h), and H.R. 11447 § 100(j), which define
utility as including but not limited to "utility in agriculture, commerce, industry,
health, or research." The other reform bills-H.R. 5924 and S. 1042, H.R. 7454 and
S. 1691, H.R. 1006 and S. 2164-and the Report of the President's Commission are
silent with respect to utility and consequently maintain the present standards.
4. S. 2756, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 100(g) (1969).
5. 1969 APLA BULL. 679-80; Letter from Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion of America to Commissioner of Patents, Oct. 14, 1969 [Copy of letter with
Catholic University Law Review].
6. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
7. Ch. 7 § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
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ment that an invention must be "useful" in order to obtain a patent. The
doctrine that a specific utility had to be asserted in the patent application
developed in the twentieth century." Earlier case law dealt mainly with
simple mechanical inventions which required minimal utility to satisfy the
statutory mandate. The chemical and pharmaceutical areas were treated
differently from the mechanical area. This dual treatment first started in
1950 when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (hereinafter cited as
C.C.P.A.) and the Patent Office both agreed that an application for a patent
had to positively assert a specific utility for the invention.9 Ten years later
the C.C.P.A. tried to reverse this test and return to the earlier standards
of utility that were imposed on chemical inventions. 10 The earlier chemical
standards were similar to the standards imposed on other types of inven-
tions such as machines and articles. The earlier test of utility was one that
required minimal compliance. The Supreme Court handed down its own
interpretation of the utility requirements." This article will discuss that
decision, the new legislation, how it affects that decision, and how to in-
terpret the new definition.
History of the Requirement
The requirement that an invention be "useful" has been in every major
patent statute since 1790. The Patent Act of 1790 granted a patent to those
who discovered any "useful" invention.' 2 The Patent Act of 179318 made
little change in this requirement for patentability. The cases decided under
these statutes dealt with mechanical devices and articles, the most famous
of these cases being Lowell v. Lewis'4 and Bedford v. Hunt.'5
In Lowell, the defendant claimed that the plaintiff's patented pumps
lacked utility. Mr. Justice Story, in the Circuit Court of Massachusetts, ac-
cepted a negative test of utility that is still the criterion for patentability.
He stated: "All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be
frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of
society. The word 'useful' therefore, is incorporated in the act in contradis-
tinction to mischievous or immoral.' 6 In Bedford, the patent was granted
8. In re Bremner, 86 U.S.P.Q. 74 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
9. Id.
10. In re Nelson, 126 U.S.P.Q. 242 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
11. Brenner v. Manson, supra note 6.
12. The Act states that a patent shall issue to anyone who invents "any useful art,
manufacture .... ." Patent Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7 § 1, 1 Stat. 109.
13. Section 1 states that anyone who invents, "any new and useful art . . ." is en-
titled to a patent. Patent Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11 § 1, 1 Stat. 318.
14. 15 F. Cas. 1018 (No. 8568) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
15. 3 F. Cas. 37 (No. 1217) (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
16. 15 F. Cas, at 1019.
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on a shoeboot. Again the utility issue was raised, and again Mr. Justice
Story concluded that the statute merely requires some beneficial use in
society. One need not establish the superiority of his invention. If the
practical utility of the invention were limited, the invention would only be
of "little or no profit to the inventor."'17 It was not the degree of utility
that governed but only that the invention should be capable of some use.
In Bedford, the negative test again applied, i.e., an invention is useful if it
is not frivolous or in contravention of public policy.
In Thompson v. Haight,'8 the application had been made for a method
of making carpets. The court held that an invention under the Patent Act
of 1793 must be substantially useful and not merely a contrivance without
any other merit than novelty. This minimal test of utility was easy to
apply to simple mechanical devices, but how does one establish utility for a
specific new chemical compound? Can a utility be established by those
skilled in the art if the utility is obvious to them because of its properties?
Or is a disclosed use a prerequisite to patentability? How much description
of the specific use must be included in the application before a patent can
issue? Does utility ultimately become the requirement to satisfy patentabil-
ity? These are the questions that confront the courts in the 20th century.
An analysis of the early cases interpreting the utility requirement in the
statutes sheds little light on the complex doctrine of utility that has evolved
with respect to the chemical and pharmaceutical area. There were no
early cases reported dealing with compositions of matter (i.e., chemical com-
pounds) and the standard of utility to be applied. "Compositions of mat-
ter" have been considered as a statutory category of invention since the
Patent Act of 1793, but in view of the lack of early case law, it was im-
possible to define the requisite standard of utility. The earliest case that
discussed a composition of matter was Langdon v. De Groot.'9 In that
case there was dicta discussing a patent obtained on a drug. The test of
utility was that it must, at the very least, be beneficial to the com-
munity. The court suggested that if it found that the twenty patients who
were treated with the drug did not survive, it would find that the drug had
no utility. That court confused the present safety standards 20 with con-
cepts of utility. However, the court did not have before it the situation
wherein a drug was capable of some beneficial use.
Some of the early cases discussing utility requirements under the Patent
17. 3 F. Cas. at 37.
18. 23 F. Cas. 1040 (No. 13957) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826).
19. 14 F. Cas. 1099 (No. 8059) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1822).
20. See In re Anthony, 162 U.S.P.Q. 594 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
[Vol. XIX:522
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Act of 183621 were Stanley v. Whipple2 2 and Roberts v. Ward.23  The first
case dealt with a patent on a stove, the latter with a method of constructing
boxes for train axles. The decisions were merely affirmations of the earlier
theories of utility. In ascertaining utility it was not important that one in-
vention be more valuable than others that accomplish the same result.2 4
The theory that any utility was sufficient under the Acts of 1793 and 1836
was reinforced in Wintermute v. Redington.2 6  These cases indicated that
the courts were inclined to accept a minimal standard of utility. As long
as this minimal utility was disclosed in the application, it was sufficient to
meet the statutory requirements. The courts applied the same standard to
all categories of invention,26 but imposed different levels of proof to establish
utility. The case law that developed in the 19th century established a test
of utility that was easily met. Most of the cases that discussed the interpre-
tation of the respective statutes were infringement suits. As soon as in-
fringement was established, it was an easy task for the courts to find utility.
Obviously the infringer was utilizing the invention, so he could not say it
lacked utility. Thus, use by another became prima facie evidence of
utility for the patentee. 27
Curtis, in his treatise on patents,28 concluded that every patent must be
capable of use, but, he wrote:
the degree of utility, whether larger or smaller, is not a subject
for consideration, in determining whether the invention will sup-
port a patent. But it is obvious that the capability of use for some
beneficial purpose is a material element in determining whether
there is a sufficiency of invention to support a patent; the force
of the word "useful". . . introduced into the statute in connection
with the epithet "new" [was] to determine whether the subject-
matter.., is capable of use, for a purpose for which any advantage
can be derived to the public.2 9
The early cases and authorities clearly established the definition of the
term "utility" in the non-chemical areas. Any utility was sufficient: how
useful the invention might be was not important. Where actual utility
21. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357 § 6, 5 Stat. 117. "[A]ny person . . . having
discovered . . . any new and useful art . . ." is entitled to a patent. Id. at 119.
22. 22 F. Cas. 1046 (No. 13286) (C.C.D. Ohio 1839).
23. 20 F. Cas. 936 (No. 11918) (C.C.D. Mich. 1849).
24. 3 F. Cas. at 37.
25. 30 F. Cas. 367 (No. 17896) (N.D. Ohio 1856).
26. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1964) (process, machine, article of
manufacture, and composition of matter).
27. See Hays v. Sulsor, 11 F. Cas. 915 (No. 6271) (S.D. Ohio 1859).
28. See In re Nelson, 126 U.S.P.Q. at 248.
29. Id.
19701
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existed, its degree was immaterial. The problem of defining "actual util-
ity" remained.
The In re Bremner Period
Until the decision by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re
Bremner,30 the test of utility was one that required little evidence to satisfy
the statutory mandate. In the mechanical cases discussed earlier it was
sufficient if any beneficial function for which the invention could be used
was shown. Case law has concluded that commercial use is not required;3 1
that perfection is not a test;3 2 that strict safety is not required;33 and that
any nonfrivolous, noninjurious use is sufficient a 4  It is not the extent of
utility that governs, but the existence of some utility.3 5
In Bremner, no disclosure of utility was made in the application. The
invention was related to the production of certain polymers of dihydropy-
ran. 3  The C.C.P.A. was "certain that the law requires that there be in the
application an assertion of utility. . . ,,13 The authority for this holding
was the Constitution, 8 patent statutes,3 9 and four cases-Potter v. Tone,40
Scoville Mfg. Co. v. Satler,41 Smokador Mfg. Co. v. Tubular Products Co.42
and In re Holmes.43 In Potter a claim to "silicon monoxid [sic]" was up-
held because the disclosed utility as a nonconductor and reducing agent was
sufficient. These were mere properties of the material, but a use could
easily be gleaned from these properties. The court stated:
To hold that it must be shown to be capable of use in some com-
mercial process and that process must have been successfully prac-
ticed would seem to amount to holding that the inventor must
make a second invention which might be the subject of another pat-
ent. . . . Such apparent usefulness of the newly-discovered
compound being shown, nothing more was requisite.44
30. 86 U.S.P.Q. 74 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
31. Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 143 F. Supp. 429
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
32. Williams v. Handschiegl, 48 F.2d 395 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
33. In re Anthony, 162 U.S.P.Q. 594 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
34. Electro-Dynamic Co. v. U.S. Light & Heat Corp., 278 F. 80 (2d Cir. 1921).
35. See 40 AM. JuR. Patents § 43 (1942).
36. See Burke, Utility of Chemical Inventions: Chameleon of the Patent Law,
43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 205, 207 (1961).
37. 86 U.S.P.Q. at 75.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Neither the Constitution nor statutes relied on re-
quired an "assertion of utility".
39. See statutes cited in the Bremner case, 86 U.S.P.Q. at 75.
40. 36 App. D.C. 181 (1911).
41. 21 F.2d 630 (D.C.D. Conn. 1927).
42. 31 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1929).
43. 16 U.S.P.Q. 399 (C.C.P.A. 1933).
44. 36 App. D.C. at 184.
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In the Scoville case, a claim to a variable condenser was upheld since
utility was established prima facie because of the granting of the patent and
the failure to show the total incapacity of the invention to do anything
claimed. Smokador was an infringement suit in which the utility of an
ash tray receptacle (made of clear glass so its contents could be seen), was
established merely by the act of infringement. The Holmes case dealt with
an article that was rejected as unpatentable because prior art showed it to be
old and well known. The strength of these authorities for the proposition
stated in Bremner is questionable. The question presented in Bremner was
totally unrelated to the factual situations in the four cases cited by the
C.C.P.A. The question of whether "an assertion of utility" had to be made
in an application was not presented in any of the authorities relied on.
The Constitution, statutes, and cases made no mention of the "assertion of
utility" as a prerequisite for patentability. The Bremner application was
unique in that there was a total failure to state any utility. The court's re-
liance on Potter v. Tone only emphasizes the traditional requirement for
utility-that is, capable of some use. "If Potter v. Tone be accepted as
controlling today, very little additional disclosure in the Bremner case would
have met the requirement of utility sufficient for patentability. ' 45 A history
of the cases prior to Bremner leads one to the conclusion that any organic
compound could be useful as an intermediate to make other compounds
under the ruling of Ex parte Watt4 6 where use as an intermediate satisfied
the utility requirement in the statute.47
After Bremner every application had to assert a utility to meet the statu-
tory requirement. 48 The Patent Office Board of Appeals in Ex parte Ladd49
held that since the art taught a use for an end product it was sufficient to
meet the utility requirement. The examiner, relying on Bremner, rejected
the claims on the grounds that they lacked an assertion of utility. The
applicants stated that their compounds were useful as intermediates for
certain syntheses and were useful in the preparation of new halogen con-
taining polymers. Since the art recognized that resulting polymers could be
made from "very closely related positioned isomers and homologs of the
claimed compounds," 50 and since the use of these resulting polymers was
known from the prior art, the Bremner test was satisfied. An interesting
45. See 20 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 727, 728 (1952).
46. 63 U.S.P.Q. 163 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942).
47. Of course the problem that arises out of this type of disclosure is not only the
satisfaction of "utility" but also the requirements of "how to use" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 (1964).
48. It should be noted that Brenner overruled Watt. See Coren & Schwartz, Do
Chemical Intermediates Have Patentable Utility? 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 479 (1961).
49. 112 U.S.P.Q. 337 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1955).
50. Id. at 338.
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dissent by Judge Burger appeared in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson.51 The
majority excluded expert testimony to show that those skilled in the art
would know what the term "film" meant.52  The polymers claimed were
disclosed to have good thermal stability and acid resistance. Judge Burger
felt that the testimony should have been admitted to show whether, in
fact, one could easily tell how to use these polymers. Although useful
properties were disclosed, the majority stated that a use for the end product
was not asserted. Yet the district court in the Petrocarbon case refused to
allow one skilled in the art to show that the use of the claimed material
was obvious!
This area was ripe for clarification when the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals was confronted with In re Nelson.58 Utility as an "intermediate
in the preparation of steroids" was asserted.5 4  The Patent Office rejection
was based on the fact that no allegation was made with respect to the
utility of the steroids produced from these intermediates. 55 The applicants
contended that new "building blocks" valuable to one doing research were
supplied "which have utility as intermediates in the search for cheaper and
shorter routes to the synthesis of steroids having therapeutic or similar ulti-
mate utility."'56 Judge Rich concluded that "a new group of steroid inter-
mediates is useful to chemists doing research on steroids."' 57 The Bremner
rule was rejected because mere assertion of utility was inferable from the
fact that the application was filed.58  The court felt the situation in Nelson
did satisfy the Bremner rule59 because the applicants had asserted that their
intermediates were useful in the field of steroid chemistry. "Nothing in the
Bremner case requires more."' 0 An ultimate utility was not a requirement
51. 247 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
52. Id. at 802.
53. 126 U.S.P.Q. 242 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
54. Id. at 246.
55. Id. at 247.
56. Id. at 250.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 252. At footnote 10, the court stated:
The first point discussed in the Bremner opinion was that a patent specifi-
cation is required by law to assert "utility" and the factual finding was that
it did not. We find on review of the record that the court was mistaken in
saying there was no assertion of utility, for the opening statement of the
Bremner et al. specification was that the invention was "new and useful".
Upon reflection, we are now of the opinion that a mere assertion of utility
in a specification is a meaningless formality and no more required by law
than an assertion of novelty. We think it only reasonable to infer from the
fact of filing an application that the applicant asserts that the invention is
new and useful, for unless it is both he has no right to a patent. 35
U.S.C. 101.
59. Id. at 252.
60. Id.
[Vol. XIX:522
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for patenting. The court pointed out that certain inventions did not require
the assertion of utility because merely naming the invention would com-
municate to one skilled in the art what its use would be. For example,
a "match," "paint," or "adhesive" would not require a specific recitation of
the use to which it may be put because that use may be inherent in a
description or may result from a disclosure of properties that would make
the use obvious. The factual situation in Nelson was distinguishable from
Bremner in that the latter merely stated that the solid polymers of the in-
vention were "resins." Judge Rich said that this was too broad and had no
definite meaning. 61 The court agreed with Judge Burger's dissent in Petro-
carbon, in which he advocated using expert testimony to show that one
skilled in the art would know how to use the invention, and stated that
even without such testimony one skilled in the art "would know of many
possible uses for the polymers."'0 2 The Supreme Court was finally pre-
sented with a similar problem in Brenner v. Manson."8
The Policy Considerations in Brenner v. Manson
In the Manson case, the Supreme Court held that an end product of a proc-
ess whose sole value was that it was employed in research did not make the
product useful within the terms of Section 101 of Title 35.64 This decision
upheld the Bremner test which had been rejected by the C.C.P.A. in the
61. Id. at 253.
62. Id. at 254.
63. 383 U.S. 519 (1964). A complete discussion of the facts of Brenner v. Manson
is unwarranted since the field of utility has been deluged with analyses of this case.
See Eggert, Uses, New Uses and Chemical Patents-A Proposal, 1968 WIs. L. REV.
901; Meyer, Utility Requirement In The Statute, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 533 (1967);
Velvel, A Critique of Brenner vs. Manson, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5 (1967); Note,
The Utility Requirement in Chemical Process and Chemical Intermediate Patent
Claims, 9 WM. & MAiY L. REV. 826 (1968). In Manson, the application was based
on a new process for making specific steroids. The Patent Office rejected the invention
for failure to disclose any utility for the steroids produced by the claimed process.
The C.C.P.A. reversed and held that where a claimed process produces a known
product it was not necessary to show utility for the product. 333 F.2d 234. The
Supreme Court reversed the C.C.P.A. and held that a process, to be patentable, must
produce a compound that has some utility. 383 U.S. at 535. The Court came to
this conclusion by an "analysis of the problem in light of the general intent of Con-
gress, the purposes of the patent system, and the implications of a decision one way or
the other." 383 U.S. at 532. This was their way of stating they would use more
logic than law to decide the issue. The Court rejected Justice Story's "negative test" of
utility by stating, "[I]t does no more than compel us to decide whether the invention
in question is 'frivolous and insignificant'-a query no easier of application than the
one built into the statute". 383 U.S. at 533.
64. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
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Nelson case. In Manson, the Court stated that the C.C.P.A. and the Patent
Office had agreed on the standard set forth in Bremner, but observed that
the C.C.P.A. "has... moved sharply away from Bremner."6 5
It has been suggested that the Court may not have realized that the
Patent Office had modified the utility requirements as early as 1940.66
After this modification, the first case to reach the courts was In re Brem-
ner. The Patent Office was apparently satisfied with the Bremner outcome
but the trend of the C.C.P.A. after Bremner was to revert to the earlier
minimal standards of utility that existed in the mechanical cases.
The Supreme Court's characterization in Manson that the Nelson case
engrafted a radical change in the standards applied to interpret the statute
appears unsupported. Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting view points out the
true consensus:
While available proof is not conclusive, the commentators seem to
be in agreement that until Application of Bremner . . . chemi-
cal patent applications were commonly granted although no re-
sulting end use was stated or the statement was in extremely
broad terms. Taking this to be true, Bremner represented a de-
viation from established practice which the C.C.P.A. has now sought
to remedy in part only to find that the Patent Office does not
want to return to the beaten track. 7
The government's brief also agrees, in essence, with the proposition that
prior to Bremner the Patent Office assumed that chemical compounds
were useful.68
The Court realized that the purpose of the patent system is to encourage
dissemination of information, and the inability of one to obtain a patent
on a process of the type claimed in Manson would encourage secrecy until a
use for the product was found. But, the majority reasoned, "in light of
the highly developed art of drafting patent claims so that they disclose as
little useful information as possible-while broadening the scope of the
claim as widely as possible-the argument based upon the virtue of the dis-
closure must be warily evaluated." 69
This is a congressional problem, not a judicial one. Claim drafting is
controlled by statute. All an applicant has to do is particularly point out
65. 383 U.S. at 530.
66. Boyle & Parker, Patents for New Chemical Compounds, 27 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
825, 831-32 (1945).
67. 383 U.S. at 539-40.
68. Brief for the Commissioner at 25, cited in Justice Harlan's opinion. 383 U.S.
at 539-40 n.3. See also Cohen & Schwartz, Do Chemical Intermediates Have Patentable
Utility? 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 479 (1961).
69. 383 U.S. at 534.
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and distinctly claim the invention.70  He may draft his claims as broadly
as the disclosure permits. The claims do not provide the disclosure to
the public; it is the specification (description of the invention) that is sup-
posed to set forth the invention "in such full, clear, concise and exact terms"
so as to allow one skilled in the art to make or use the invention. 71 It
should be noted that the case law is well settled with respect to utility in
the specification: only one use is required in the specification.7 2  But the
Court in Manson did not consider a research use as being one disclosed
use and imposed a higher standard of patentability. The Court declared:
"If the inventor of a process cannot himself ascertain a 'use' for that which
his process yields, he has every incentive to make his invention known
to those able to do so.'' 73 This reasoning is faulty. The more logical ap-
proach would be to prevent disclosure until a use could be found by the
inventor so he could obtain the patent himself. However, the concept of
non-disclosure is repugnant to the patent system which encourages early
disclosure.
Commentators have pointed out that some "academic researchers" are
not interested in profit and would publish their discoveries to enable others
to experiment with them.74  This may be true to some extent, but notice
how many colleges and universities are patenting their research results
because of the high costs of modem research. The demand for a return
on their investment is becoming greater than the demand to divulge their
discoveries to academia without first securing patent protection.
The Court in Manson also stated that if the type of process disclosed in
the application were patented, the disclosure would prevent others from
further research for fear of infringing the patent. Thus, there would be
little incentive for the public to search for new uses. The patent that
would issue on the process grants a monopoly on just that process and not
the product that results therefrom. Of course, if this were the only known
process for making the product, the patentee could have effectively obtained
a second monopoly. However, modem chemists have at their disposal a
host of methods for synthesizing compounds and such "second monopolies"
70. The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly point-
ing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention. A claim may be written in independent or dependent
form, and if independent form, it shall be construed to include all the limi-
tations of the claim incorporated by reference into the independent claim.
Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1964).
71. Id.
72. See Parker v. Biel, 159 U.S.P.Q. 614 (Pat. Off. Bd. of Interferences 1968).
73. 383 U.S. at 534.
74. See Velvel, A Critique of Brenner vs Manson, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 5, 8
(1969).
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are rare. Also, the Court might have ignored the fact that the patent statute
also grants protection on a "new use" of an old compound. This encour-
ages new use research and does not, as the Court feared, prevent it. It
has been suggested that the Court did not know such "new use" protection
was available since it was not mentioned in any of the briefs before the
Court, nor did the opinion contain any reference to this part of the stat-
ute.75 The Court's discussion of hampering experimentation on the product
if a patent was granted is totally unsupported in the case law. Experi-
mental use has never been considered infringing use. 76
How Should We Define "Utility"?
There is some authority for the premise that compositions are useful per se.
Prior to 1950, any organic compound had utility as an intermediate, 77 but
subsequent interpretation of the law modified this holding. Judge Rich
feels it is an "illegal practice" 78 to require two inventions (discovery of the
compound and discovery of its use) before one can be patented. A variety
of problems arise in the area of intermediates.
If an intermediate is held unpatentable to one person because a useful
end product is not yet known, and later an end product is discovered by
another, who is the inventor? Are the two persons joint inventors?
"Joint inventor" treatment is not possible because the inventor of the com-
pound was not the inventor of its use. There was no concert of action.
75. Id. at 9. It should be emphasized that the patent grant only gives one the
right to exclude others. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1964). See Herman v. Youngstown Car
Mfg. Co., 191 F. 579 (6th Cir. 1911). The result of a "new use" patent is that the
patentee must obtain the patented compound in order to practice his own "new use"
invention. If the patentee of the compound refuses to license or sell the compound
the "new use" patentee is effectively precluded from practicing his own invention.
What might occur is a cross-licensing agreement that would be beneficial to both
parties. There is an area of public policy that might be affected by a monopoly on a
compound when the patentee refuses to make the compound available. The public
need for a cancer cure or any cure for diseases, that might be discovered after the
initial compound were patented, might lead to compulsory licensing legislation. The
drug industry was quite aware of the possibility of compulsory licensing legislation
throughout the era of the Kefauver investigations in 1959. A complete discussion of
this legislation is found in Cacciapaglia & Rockman, The Proposed Drug Industry Anti-
trust Act-Patents Pricing, and the Public, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 875 (1962).
76. See In re Kirk, 153 U.S.P.Q. 266, 281 & n.7 (1967).
77. Ex parte Watt, 63 U.S.P.Q. 163 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1942).
78. In re Kirk, 153 U.S.P.Q. 266, 275 (1967). One commentator has stated:
The section 101 utility requirement should be amended to provide that chemi-
cal intermediates, per se, meet the utility requirement. This section should
further be amended to provide that operability is the test of process utility ...
The power to eliminate the stifling environment of the chemical patent law
lies with Congress; its exercise is earnestly encouraged.
Stewart, The Utility Requirement in Chemical Process and Chemical Intermediate
Patent Claims, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 269, 289 (1969).
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The reverse is also true, i.e., the inventor of a possible "new use"' could
not join in with the inventor of the compound if a "new use" application
were filed under 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). The Court indicated in Manson that
an inventor would be encouraged to disclose the unpatented invention so
others could find a practical utility. 79 There may be a problem of public
use or publication that might create a statutory bar if made more than one
year prior to filing.80 Perhaps no bar can exist on an incomplete invention
and the time period starts to run at the point at which it was possible to file
for a patent.
Judge Rich points out in Kirk that it is common practice in industry to
"fabricate" uses by common chemical reactions to produce an ultimate end
use that may be knowingly commercially unfeasible, and chemically im-
practicable: "If one skilled in the chemical art knows how to convert any
new compound into a material which will have the sort of utility that the
non-skilled understands, it is possible, at the expense of valuable time and
effort to demonstrate eventual utility." 8' For example, compounds having a
benzene ring were easily sulfonated to produce a compound that possessed
surface-activity with the applicant having full knowledge that the production
expenses of the new sulfonated compound prohibited its employment as an
intermediate for the production of a wetting agent. Another instance was
the hydrolyzation of a material being used in cancer research and the con-
version of the resulting free acid into a copper salt which had a use as fungi-
cide. Since the use as fungicide would certainly satisfy the test of utility,
any claim to the compound would inherently protect the cancer research
related uses.8 2 Because only one use is necessary to satisfy the statutory re-
quirement and since Patent Office inquiry is rare once the assertion of
utility is made,83 the applicant is really not giving the public any benefit
of a disclosure in the utility area if a "fabricated" use is disclosed. But, if
79. 383 U.S. at 534.
80. One may not acquire a patent if "the invention was ...described in a printed
publication... or [was] in public use or on sale... more than one year prior to the
date of the application for patent ...... Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964).
81. 153 U.S.P.Q. at 277.
82. in re Thuau, 135 F.2d 344 (C.C.P.A. 1943) The patentee does not have to
recite every use for his compound or composition-his claim to the material protects
all such uses whether or not such use was known prior or subsequent to his own dis-
closed uses.
83. There are few areas where the Patent Office inquiry into utility is extensive.
So called "incredible assertions" are usually thoroughly questioned. See In re
Ferens, 163 U.S.P.Q. 609 (C.C.P.A. 1969) where an invention alleged it was a cure for
baldness. Where there is an allegation that the invention will cure a problem previ-
ously deemed uncurable, the Patent Office requires overwhelming proof. See also In re
Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1940); Ex parte Wolf, 65 U.S.P.Q. 527 (Pat. Off.
Bd. App. 1945).
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there was a requirement that an allegation of research utility be specified in
the application, the benefit of such a disclosure would be far more valuable
than any benefit from a "fabricated" utility.
Judge Rich suggests that a compound is useful per se. The requirement
of utility should not be different for chemical inventions than any other
category of invention. Different requirements would seem to be "an unde-
sirable discrimination between chemical compounds and other classes of
invention."'84 There are other authorities who believe a composition is
useful per se, 85 but, other than the mere disclosure of the composition, there
is no quid pro quo8 for the patent grant. Although a patent grant on a
compound without a disclosed use would encourage early disclosure to the
public, it is of no use to the public if nothing further is disclosed. Any
grant of a patent on a compound with no known utility would, as the Su-
preme Court states in Manson, "disclose as little useful information as pos-
sible-while broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible." 87
There is some value in disclosing the compound if it is the subject of
serious scientific research. Disclosure of these research activities should
be sufficient to meet the quantum of evidence necessary to show utility.
The material is useful to those who are utilizing it in serious research and
investigation. Conversely, a compound or composition of no present value
84. Meyer, Utility Requirement in the Statute, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 533, 544
(1967).
85. E.g., Meyer, supra note 84. A novel proposal is made by Paul Eggert, Wis. L.
REV. at 913 (1968). He contends there are four points at which inventions could take
place, (1) upon conception of the compound, (2) upon synthesis, (3) upon conception
of a use for that compound, and (4) upon a reduction to practice of an ultimate use.
He feels "how to make" the compound and "how to use" it (examples 2 and 4) are
the only sufficient criteria of patentability, thus giving protection to the method of
producing the compound and the method of using it. While he urges patentability of
the process and any new use, he intentially omits patentability of the compound. He
states that countries such as Japan, West Germany, Sweden and Switzerland deny com-
pound patents. He feels that no one should be granted control over more than he has
contributed, but what Eggert fails to realize is that a compound grants no greater mo-
nopoly because of failure to specify all of its possible uses. If someone discovers a
new use he is entitled to it as a matter of law. The new use invention was made possible
by the disclosure of the compound. What would be the incentive to disclose a com-
pound to the public if no patent could be granted. If the disclosure is not made the
"how to use" is never discovered by the public. His contention that competition could
encourage the development of superior "how to make" fails to realize that experimen-
tal use is not considered infringing use. See Chesterfield v. United States, 116 U.S.P.Q.
445 (Ct. Cl. 1958). The public would still have the right to experiment with the com-
pound, but as the author points out, its source would be limited to the patentee. But
then the public would not have the benefit of the compound to experiment with if it
were not for the patentee. The author is prophetic when he states that the courts
would be spared a problem of defining a minimum qualitative utility. This is in fact
what the new definition is attempting to accomplish.
86. See In re Kirk, 153 U.S.P.Q. 266, 275 (1967).
87. 383 U.S. at 534.
[Vol. XIX:522
Utility and the New Legislation
should not be patentable. The constitutional mandate of Article 1, section 8
is to "promote the progress of the useful arts and sciences" and speculation
as to future utility should be insufficient for that purpose. Utility is de-
termined as of the date of invention,"" and not when a use is discovered.
A building block (as intermediates are called) to build nothing of present
value is of no value at all unless there is some link to another material with
a known use. Research should be sufficient to supply this link, but how to
define a threshold of utility slightly above "no use" is difficult. The quan-
tum of utility necessary to satisfy the statute should be met by alleging
utility in research, with that research being fully set forth in the application.
Judge Smith, in his dissent in In re Joly,s9 stated that proof of the fact
that those possessing ordinary skills in the art "know how to and can use
or are using the invention"90 would be sufficient to meet the test of utility.
He fully supported the idea that objects of use to researchers do promote
the progress of science. 1  With this in mind, and barring separate stand-
ards for each category of invention, it follows that a chemical invention
should be treated like other inventions and should require minimal utility.
Judicial and Administrative Interpretation
Upon enactment of the new definition new Patent Office Guidelines on
utility should be promulgated. As a result of developing case law, the
Patent Office, in 1968, established guidelines for considering disclosures of
utility in drug cases.9 2 They were set up to assist the public and the exami-
ners when examining applications in that area. The utility of a material had
to "be definite and in currently available form, not merely for further in-
vestigation or research.193  These guidelines are an administrative codifica-
tion of the decisions prior to 1968 and only reflect the present standard of
utility. It should be noted that certain aspects of the guidelines should still
be followed. For example, if the asserted utility is believable on its face to
persons skilled in the art then the burden is on the examiner to give adequate
support for rejecting on lack of utility.94  Correspondingly, statements not
deemed likely to be correct by one skilled in the art require adequate proof
by the applicant.9 5 Inventions to cure baldness or cancer are typical exam-
88. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Link Aviation, 182 F. Supp. 106 (N.D.N.Y. 1959).
89. 153 U.S.P.Q. 243 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
90. Id. at 258.
91. Id.
92. 849 0. G. PAT. OFF. 567 (1968).
93. Id. at 567.
94. Id. at 568. See also In re Gazave, 154 U.S.P.Q. 92 (C.C.P.A. 1967) where it
was held that the Patent Office required too much proof where it gives no adequate
reason to disbelieve the specification's statement of usefulness.
95. In re Citron, 139 U.S.P.Q. 516 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
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pies where the Patent Office requires a high level of proof and is supported
by the courts. In re Ferens9" was a typical "hair-growing" application. The
court said that "where an applicant predicates utility for the claimed invention
on allegations of the sort here which are or border on the incredible in light
of contemporary knowledge of the particular art, those allegations must be
substantiated by acceptable evidence. '97
Another problem in the utility area is whether tests in humans should be
required for new drug compounds. The standard set up in In re Krimme 98
should be adopted as the universal standard. The applicant alleged as the
utility of his compound that it was an anti-inflammatory, anti-bacterial agent
that decreased vascular permeability. The examiner rejected the application
on lack of utility because there was an absence of clear and convincing
proof that the composition was "safe, effective and reliable for all therapeu-
tic effects with human beings." 99 The examiner required the utility to be
proven by tests in humans and rejected experimentation in animals as incon-
clusive. The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection for the
following reasons. First, the fact that the compound was utilized success-
fully in animals was unconvincing as to its effectiveness in humans. Second,
the economic value of administering the medication to animals to save them
was insufficient utility. Third, many tests that gave promising animal re-
sults failed to prove out in humans. 100 On appeal the C.C.P.A., however,
held that "pharmaceutical applications" included the treatment of animals
and declared that "when an applicant for a patent has alleged in his patent
application that a new and unobvious chemical compound exhibits some use-
ful pharmaceutical property and when this property has been established by
statistically significant tests with 'standard experimental animals,' sufficient
statutory utility for the compound has been presented."'' 1  Since the com-
pound had established some effective pharmaceutical property in a standard
experimental animal, it had made a contribution to the art whether or not the
compound performs in the same manner in humans. This is the most authori-
tative statement on this subject since the Supreme Court reserved judgment
of the issue and stated in Brenner v. Manson: "[W]e express no view as to
the patentability of a process whose sole demonstrated utility is to yield a
product shown to inhibit the growth of tumors in laboratory animals.' 02
This broader treatment of utility for chemical and pharmaceutical inven-
96. 163 U.S.P.Q. 609 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
97. Id. at 611.
98. 130 U.S.P.Q. 215 (C.C.P.A 1961).
99. Id. at 216.
100. Id. at 217.
101. Id. at 219.
102. 383 U.S. at 531 n.17.
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tions should be made part of the legislative history as suggested by the
American Patent Law Association. 03 Compositions, as subjects of use test-
ing, which accomplish the stated results in standard experimental animals are
useful under the requirements of Section 101 of Title 35. An ultimate utility
should not be a requirement for patenting. This reasoning is sound because
the monopoly on the invention would probably be useless if its effectiveness
for human use is not established. Anyone could secure a "new use" patent
at a later date. An analysis of the time and costs of development of suitable
drugs suggests that it is practically an economic necessity for that industry to
secure early patent protection. To produce a drug normally would take five
to seven years from the test tube commercialization, and a cost of at least
half a million dollars.'0 4  The drug "Aldomet", for example, took twelve
years to develop at a cost of eleven million dollars.105
Further, the drug industry is always subject to the risk of a new drug
replacing another. In 1950, a new drug "Cortone"' 06 was marketed and
within six years the percentage of the market controlled by the drug fell from
100 percent to 3.2 percent. The granting of a patent during the development
stages at the very least acts as an incentive for the drug industry to assume the
risks of development and rapid obsolescence. An additional reward is that
the resulting intermediate monopoly may give the developer a head start
toward patent protection. It should also be noted that many governmental
agencies lose valuable rights and incur unnecessary expenditures, since they
don't have the facilities to develop the appropriate "utility" after the discov-
ery of new compounds. Agencies such as the National Institute of Health
(Department of Health, Education and Welfare) are compelled to "farm
out" work to other agencies or private industry to provide them with a suit-
able utility for the newly founded material. A research utility is unsatisfac-
tory under present case law as discussed above.
Conclusion
There are various problems that must be resolved if the new definition of
utility is to be of any value to the public. The first problem is related to ex-
perimental use. Judge Worley's dissent in In re Nelson'07 suggested pre-
cluding a patent on a compound whose sole utility to researchers was based on
a theory of an unearned monopoly that prevented others from experimenting
103. 1969 APLA BULL. 679-80.
104. 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 648, 653 (1965).
105. Id. at 653.
106. See Cacciapaglia & Rockman, The Proposed Drug Industry Anti-Trust Act-
Patents, Pricing, and the Public, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 875, 882-n.41 (1962).
107. 126 U.S.P.Q. 242, 258 (C.C.P.A. 1960) .
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in a field that should remain open to all. He inferred that unless one was
willing to risk infringement such experimentation would be discouraged. He
failed to realize that experimental use has never been considered infring-
ing use. 108 Any process that produces a compound that is the subject of
scientific research should be useful per se. The utility of the product being
established, any new process that makes this product more readily available
(by decreasing costs, time, etc.) warrants protection. If a patent is granted
on a compound whose sole utility is for experimental use in a specified area,
the fact that others experiment with the compound cannot be considered in-
fringement. How else would a "new use" be found if the law did not permit
some degree of non-infringing use? There is no intent to infringe when
experimental use occurs. 109 Even if the compound was being used in the
very same area of research as disclosed by the original applicant, this should
not be considered infringing use since the original research was inconclusive
and only an allegation of utility was made. The applicant's claims are drawn
to the compound and not to its utility. Any experimental use, even in the
area of its possible utility, should be encouraged.
Another suggestion that could be used to implement the statute would be a
requirement than an applicant "follow-up" his original disclosure of experi-
mental use with an amendment pointing out the results of the research to
date. When a disclosure of utility is made under the new definition (i.e.,
useful to researchers in a specified area or efficacy of the compound in stand-
ard experimental animals) the applicant could be required to submit, as a
matter of course, a concise summary of activities performed after filing but
before payment of the issue fee. The public would benefit from this disclos-
ure of results from any later experimentation. The affidavit should avoid
inclusion of new matter. 110 Evidence tending to show that one of ordinary
skill in the art would know how to use or know of a use for the invention
should not be considered new matter."' Affidavits, to show outstanding
utility, have played a part in obtaining allowance of claims, and amend-
ments to the specification incorporating the affidavit could be required.
One might fear that this type of practice would tend to encourage long
prosecution within the Patent Office in order to find additional uses to pre-
clude a later "new use" patent. Such stalling tactics would not fulfill the
constitutional mandate of promoting the arts and sciences by prompt disclos-
108. See In re Kirk 153 U.S.P.Q. 266, 281, n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dis-
senting).
109. Experimentation for "the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or
curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee."
Popleston v. Kitchen, 19 F. Cas. 1048 (No. 11279) (C.C.D. Pa. 1812).
110. Ex parte Scudi, 123 U.S.P.Q. 504 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959).
111. Ex parte Harmon, 86 U.S.P.Q. 487 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1949).
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ure. Under the newly proposed legislation the patent would expire 20
years" 2 from the date of filing. This provision would discourage long prose-
cution by cutting short the length of the monopoly. These additions to the
disclosure would be in the nature of updating the application. Since the
goal for processing applications by the Patent Office is eighteen months, the
public would benefit from the additional disclosure of such items as whether
use testing in animals progressed to the human stage or if any valuable end
products had been produced from the intermediates.
Alan Grimaldi
112. S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 154 (1969).
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